The State Will See You Now

Licensed to Agree

California has found something else wrong with your doctor: she may be explaining medicine without sufficient supervision from people who write laws.

On November 16, the Supreme Court declined to hear Khatibi v. Yip, a challenge to California’s requirement that covered continuing medical education courses include material on implicit bias. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Samuel Alito; Justice Neil Gorsuch also wanted to hear the case. The Court’s refusal left the lower-court ruling in place. It did not produce a Supreme Court decision declaring California’s theory correct. That distinction matters, particularly when the subject is who gets to put words into somebody else’s mouth.

This is exactly the kind of institutional adolescence I examine in America, Act Your Age. An adult presents an argument and accepts the possibility of disagreement. A child demands that everybody repeat the answer that makes him comfortable. Give that child a legislative majority, and suddenly the repetition becomes a professional requirement. We are assured that the purpose is education. Yet the defining feature of education is supposed to be that something can enter the room besides the approved conclusion.

The physician at the center of this dispute is Dr. Azadeh Khatibi, an ophthalmologist who teaches other physicians.

According to Pacific Legal Foundation, which represents her, her courses include subjects such as retinal tumors and glaucoma. She objects that mandatory implicit-bias material takes time away from the subjects she considers relevant to those courses. This is not a woman demanding permission to treat patients badly. It is a physician asking whether the state can make her deliver a message in a privately developed class.

Picture signing up to learn more about a disease threatening somebody’s eyesight. You have limited time, a room full of professionals, and a subject complicated enough to justify gathering them together. Then Sacramento arrives with an additional assignment. Before everyone leaves better prepared to recognize the problem, the state would like to make sure its preferred social explanation has received adequate exposure. The patient cannot see, but at least the curriculum has demonstrated awareness.

The joke is not that doctors are incapable of bias. Doctors are people, and people bring assumptions into their work. The question is whether identifying that ordinary human fact gives government permission to prescribe how private instructors discuss a contested explanation of medical outcomes. Those are different propositions. A politician who cannot distinguish them should perhaps complete a continuing education course himself. I would recommend one on the difference between establishing a problem and establishing ownership of everybody else’s answer.

California’s requirements describe examples of how implicit bias can affect perceptions and treatment decisions, or strategies addressing how unintended biases may contribute to disparities. The rule has exceptions, including certain research-only courses without a direct-patient-care component and courses from providers outside California. This is therefore not a claim that every scientific conversation in the state begins with an ideological attendance sheet. It is a dispute over a substantial government requirement imposed within professional education.

What makes the case especially revealing is the legal reasoning.

The lower courts treated the relevant course content as government speech. Thomas argued that extensive regulation of a profession does not turn private instructors into government speakers. His concern was bigger than this particular curriculum: government cannot escape scrutiny of its control over private expression simply by asserting that the expression now belongs to government. That was his dissent, not the Court’s holding.

Think about the transaction being proposed. You acquired the knowledge. You developed the course. You stand in front of the room. People attend because they believe you have something worth teaching. But somewhere between obtaining a license and opening your presentation, the government discovers that your voice is part of its equipment. That is an impressive acquisition strategy. Most organizations have to buy a microphone. A sufficiently ambitious bureaucracy can apparently acquire the person holding the microphone.

The distinction between standards and scripts should not be difficult. Professional standards ask whether somebody can perform the work competently. A script tells him which message to deliver. I want standards high enough that the person examining my eyes actually knows what he is looking at. I do not need the state using his lecture schedule as an advertising platform for its preferred theory of society. A medical license should certify qualifications, not establish a timeshare arrangement with the physician’s vocabulary.

As a Black man, I find the moral packaging especially tiresome.

Whenever institutions announce that they are doing something on behalf of people like me, I would like them to explain the practical benefit before expecting applause. Which problem are you solving? How will you determine whether the intervention helped? What happens if a qualified person disputes the explanation? “We are addressing disparities” is the beginning of an answer, not the end of every permissible question. I do not become safer because a legislature discovers a more flattering way to describe its authority.

Nor do I need my doctor approaching me as a collection of demographic instructions assembled by strangers. I need him to ask questions, listen carefully, examine the evidence, and recognize when his assumptions are wrong. My history matters because it is my history. My symptoms matter because I have them. Treating me as an individual requires considerably more work than assigning me to a category and congratulating yourself for remembering the category’s approved concerns. The fashionable vocabulary can become another shortcut around actually knowing the person.

That is why the Khatibi dispute deserves attention beyond the usual arguments over DEI. The underlying issue is whether professional judgment remains something adults exercise or becomes something institutions permit after the correct demonstration of agreement. A physician should be able to make the case for a particular educational approach. Another physician should be able to challenge it. The fact that the discussion involves prejudice does not make discussion itself prejudiced. Otherwise, the premise protects itself by prosecuting the question.

Imagine applying that method to an ordinary medical conference.

Imagine a doctor asking for evidence that a particular bias-training exercise improves patient care. Instead of answering the question, the instructor suggests that asking it proves the doctor needs the training. That isn’t education. It’s a clever way to make the theory impossible to challenge: agree with it and you pass; question it and you’ve proved you need another class.

The state also has an advantage that a persuasive instructor does not need: it can make participation consequential. A speaker with a weak presentation may lose the audience. A government with a weak justification can add a requirement. That difference should make us more skeptical, not less. If a curriculum has demonstrated value, its advocates ought to be eager to explain that value to the people expected to teach it. “You must include this” tells me what authority wants. It does not, by itself, tell me what patients gain.

There is a quiet disrespect in treating highly trained adults as though they cannot be trusted to consider a subject unless the government supervises the conclusion. We tell physicians to develop judgment, keep learning, and take responsibility for difficult decisions. Then, when one of them objects to a mandated lesson, the answer is that the state has already settled the relevant question. Apparently, years of education qualify a doctor to identify a retinal tumor but not to decide how best to teach a class about one.

The Supreme Court’s refusal to take the case means this argument has not received the hearing the challengers wanted. It also means supporters should not confuse survival of the requirement with proof of its educational wisdom. Courts decide legal disputes; they do not transform every policy left standing into a successful intervention. A mandate still has to answer for what it requires, what it displaces, and whether its benefits justify its reach. A favorable procedural result is not a clinical outcome.

For the rest of us, the lesson is to look past the comforting name on the requirement.

“Bias training” sounds benevolent. So do “awareness,” “inclusion,” and a great many other labels attached to demands for obedience. The name does not tell you whether the training is useful, whether the rule is appropriately limited, or whether dissenting professionals retain meaningful freedom. Those are adult questions. The refusal to tolerate them is the part that interests me.

In America, Act Your Age, I draw a distinction between science’s capacity for correction and bureaucracy’s instinct for self-preservation. One becomes stronger when its claims survive examination. The other often becomes more comfortable when examination stops. Khatibi’s case puts that difference in a room full of doctors and asks who controls the lesson. California’s answer deserves considerably more scrutiny than it has received.

I want a physician capable of telling me something I do not want to hear because the evidence requires it. I want that same physician free to tell the government something it does not want to hear for precisely the same reason.

If California wants to improve medical judgment, it could start by allowing the people who practice medicine to keep theirs.

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